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CRIMINAL ADVISORY JURIES: A SENSIBLE
COMPROMISE FOR JURY SENTENCING
ADVOCATES
Kurt A. Holtzman
ABSTRACT
Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch recently noted that “juries in our constitutional
order exercise supervisory authority over the judicial function by limiting the judge’s
power to punish.” Yet in the majority of jurisdictions, contemporary judge-only sentencing
practices neuter juries of their supervisory authority by divorcing punishment from guilt
decisions. Moreover, without a chance to voice public disapproval at sentencing, juries
are muted in their ability to express tailored, moral condemnation for distinct criminal
acts. Although the modern aversion to jury sentencing is neither historically nor
empirically justified, jury sentencing opponents are rightly cautious of abdicating
sentencing power to laypeople. Nevertheless, jury endorsement of criminal sentencing is
critical to the legitimacy of criminal law. It is also necessary if criminal law is to remain
responsive to evolving social mores. Unfortunately, today, studies suggest that actual
criminal sentences are largely detached, if not divergent, from community preference. The
criminal advisory jury is a mechanism to solve these issues by allowing juries to express
community sentiment on punishment while preserving the values inherent in autonomous
judicial sentencing. The jury is one of the most democratic institutions within the United
States and sits readily assembled for most criminal trials. Failing to solicit its views of just
desert for the criminal it has convicted is an opportunity wasted; an opportunity the
criminal advisory jury construct will seize.
INTRODUCTION
Since the nation’s founding, juries have been viewed as a hallmark of the AngloAmerican legal system.1 The ultimate adjudication of both criminal conviction and civil


J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. Special thanks to Professor Shari Seidman Diamond,
without whose seminar on juries and early encouragement this Note would have never been possible.
Thank you to Judge Morris B. Hoffman and Judge James S. Gwin. Their writings on juries and sentencing
provided the genesis for this idea. I borrowed from them admiringly. Thank you as well to the
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy, especially Alana Paris, Emily Gleichert, and Kate
Vandenberg. I am humbled by their grace and editorial skill.
1
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968) (“Among the resolutions adopted by the First
Congress of the American Colonies (the Stamp Act Congress) on October 19, 1765 . . . was the declaration:
‘That trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies.’”);
THOMAS JEFFERSON, The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 442 (Adrienne Koch & William
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liability by lay community representatives, rather than government officials or legal elites,
legitimizes the law and provides democratic endorsement for the normative goals the law
seeks to achieve.2 Unlike both the judge and the legislator, a jury’s expression of moral
condemnation is immune from impeachment by institutional and political influences.3 And
in the criminal context, the jury stands as the final intercessor between the coercive power
of the state and the individual liberties the state seeks to deny.4 These principles, germane
to the ratification of the jury right within the Constitution,5 remain paramount today.6
Despite the importance of juries and the Sixth Amendment’s protection of the
criminal jury right,7 the criminal jury’s sentencing power remains hollow.8 In the majority
of jurisdictions, the jury’s role in a noncapital criminal trial is relegated to the determination
of guilt while punishment is administered by judge alone.9 Juries, for their part, are asked
to mechanically apply broadly applicable laws to nuanced situations and form binary
decisions on guilt while remaining deliberately ignorant of those decisions’ consequences.
Criminal culpability, on the contrary, is not binary;10 it lies along a continuum of right and
wrong defined by social mores and cultural norms. Decoupling punishment from guilt
forces a false dichotomy onto juries which is not only unrealistic in the abstract but a
practical hazard to the fact-finding function of trials. Without a say in punishment, juries’
ability to tailor their moral condemnation to criminal acts is stifled. And, in situations
where the law does not align neatly with the idea of justice that particular circumstances

Peden eds., 1993) (The jury is “the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be
held to the principles of its constitution.”).
2
Gianni Ribeiro & Emma Antrobus, Investigating the Impact of Jury Sentencing Recommendations Using
Procedural Justice Theory, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 535, 536 (2017).
3
“[T]he truth of every accusation . . . should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve
of his equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion.” 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 349-50 (Cooley ed. 1899) (emphasis added). See Jenia Iontcheva,
Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 350-53 (2003).
4
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
5
The Declaration of Independence stated solemn objections to the King's making “Judges dependent on his
Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries,” and to his
“depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.” The Declaration of Independence (U.S.
1776).
6
“[J]uries in our constitutional order exercise supervisory authority over the judicial function by limiting
the judge’s power to punish. . . . [T]he Constitution’s guarantees cannot mean less today than they did the
day they were adopted. . . .” United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2376 (2019).
7
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (“[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury
sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact.”).
9
In noncapital felony cases, only six states permit juries to make sentencing decisions. ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-4-103 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (West
2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 926.1 (West 2016); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.07 (West 2019);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (West 2007). Likewise, sentencing is conducted by the judge in all federal
courts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.
10
“[C]riminal law . . . is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also with the degree
of criminal culpability.” Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975).
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demand, the only check a jury has against the coercive power of the state is to bend the
truth through nullification.11
Advocates for expanding the jury’s role in sentencing point to the reemergence of
retributivism as the leading theory of punishment and the comparative superiority of juries
in defining just deserts.12 Opponents, however, suggest a jury’s cure is worse than the
disease, characterizing juries as incompetent, emotionally irrational, and erratic.13 They
argue that if sentencing is left to untrained laypeople, not only will it threaten truth-finding
by enabling jury compromise,14 but it will produce fickle and unfair outcomes,15
deteriorating the confidence society places in the rule of law itself. In other words, although
the tyranny of the state should be feared, so too should the tyranny of the crowd.16 Not only
is the jury’s current limited role traditionally and constitutionally supported,17 but the
judge, it is argued, represents the best alternative for applying the law in an objective,
unprejudiced, and consistent manner.18 Furthermore, jury competence aside, expanding the
jury’s role as sentencer will impose additional procedural costs onto a court system already
overburdened and under-resourced.19
Reasonable minds can and do disagree on whether a jury is suited to assume
responsibility for noncapital criminal sentencing. This Note does not seek to settle that
debate. Instead, it proposes a modest procedural inclusion of the jury at the criminal
11

Juror nullification refers to the power of jurors to return verdicts that are counter to both the law and the
evidence. Irwin A. Horowitz, Norbert Kerr, Ernest Park & Christine Gockel, Chaos in the Courtroom
Reconsidered: Emotional Bias and Juror Nullification, 30 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 164 (2006).
Although documented incidents of juror nullification are rare, when juries do nullify, it is typically due to a
perception that the law or its consequences are unfair. Mary Claire Mulligan, Jury Nullification: Its History
and Practice, COLO. LAW., Dec. 2004, at 71, 75. For this reason, some observers contend that juror
sentencing authority actually negates juror nullification. See Comment, Consideration of Punishment by
Juries, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 400, 409 (1950) (suggesting nullification can be eliminated by permitting juries
to recommend mercy thereby “eas[ing] their consciences . . . by convincing themselves that the penalty will
be light.”).
12
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614-16 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring); see Morris B. Hoffman, The Case
for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 991-92 (2003); Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 350.
13
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157.
14
Compromise verdicts are verdicts resulting from situations in which jurors agree to a lighter sentence in
order to break deadlocks on guilt. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 989.
15
Charles W. Webster, Jury Sentencing—Grab-Bag Justice, 14 SW. L.J. 221, 230 (1960); Robert A.
Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 45 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 39 (1994); Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J.
1355, 1374-75 (1999).
16
James Madison, while discussing how a representative democracy can ensure the triumph of critical
reason over irrational desire, maintained that “it is the reason of the public alone that ought to controul and
regulate the government. [But] [t]he passions [of the public] ought to be controuled and regulated by the
government . . . Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have
been a mob.” 10 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 505 (Robert A. Rutland et al eds.,
Univ. of Chicago Press 1977).
17
See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 967, for a discussion on how the dominance of judicial sentencing in state
and federal courts resulted from an historical accident. See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 972, for a discussion
on jury sentencing as it relates to the evolution of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
18
See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 7-8 (1998); William W. Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 339,
339 (1991).
19
Randall R. Jackson, Missouri's Jury Sentencing Law: A Relic the Legislature Should Lay to Rest, 55 J.
MO. B. 14, 14-15 (1999).
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sentencing stage which relies on neither a radical shift in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
nor a voluntary abdication of judicial sentencing discretion. This Note proposes the
adoption of a criminal advisory jury; specifically, one used for noncapital criminal
sentencing. To some extent, the idea parallels the current availability of advisory juries in
civil cases; however, the proposal does not mirror the civil advisory jury in full. Although
this Note’s proposal involves multiple facets, its underlying premise is that the use of
advisory juries for noncapital criminal sentencing represents a sensible compromise
between jury sentencing advocates and jury sentencing opponents by allowing for a
community voice at the punishment phase of trial without inviting the significant
inefficiencies, potential inconsistencies, or possible mistakes that some fear juries may
produce.20
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background for understanding
how jury sentencing has evolved over time into its current, limited role and how modern
policy arguments weigh against its expansion. Part II examines ways in which both formal
and informal advisory juries are currently being used in litigation. This includes the
formalized civil advisory jury, non-binding jury sentencing schemes currently in force in a
minority of jurisdictions, and informal jury opinions sought or permitted by judges during
sentencing. Lessons derived from these examples help shape the criminal advisory jury
proposal. Part III outlines that proposal.
I.

BACKGROUND

Before discussing the criminal advisory jury proposal, some context is warranted.
Neither the history detailed next nor the overview of the jury sentencing debate which
follows is meant to be exhaustive. Instead, it simply provides the framework necessary to
claim, as the subtitle does, why this proposal represents a compromise.
A. History of Jury Sentencing
In the American legal system today, noncapital criminal jury sentencing is viewed as
an anachronism. Only six states preserve some form of the practice.21 Although the
conventional wisdom has trended away from jury sentencing, understanding the historical
underpinnings of that trend is necessary for countenancing change. Like most good legal
origin stories in this country, the history of jury sentencing begins in England.
Although the ancient Greeks and Romans used juries to decide both guilt and
punishment, England had no jury tradition until William the Conqueror established the
institution toward the end of the eleventh century.22 Even after the Norman Conquest,
however, jury trials remained exceedingly rare until the medieval alternatives of trial by
combat, compurgation, and ordeal began to fall into disrepute around the mid-1200s.23
20

See supra note 15.
See supra note 9.
22
LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 2-3, 13-19 (2d ed. 1988).
23
1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 37-40 (2d ed. 1898). Trial by combat disappeared by the end of the reign of
Edward III in the late-1300s. EDWARD J. WHITE, LEGAL ANTIQUITIES 118 (1913). Trial by compurgation,
which involved the accused taking an oath of innocence and then calling a sufficient number of “oath
helpers”—often twelve—to vouch under oath to the accused’s trustworthiness, ROBERT VON
MOSCHZISKER, TRIAL BY JURY §§ 43-45 (2d ed. 1930), was officially banned in 1166 by Henry II. MOORE,
21
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While the rise of juries tempered the cruelty of criminal trials, criminal punishment
remained particularly harsh for centuries longer.24 For instance, almost all serious crimes
through the 1600s in England carried the death penalty.25 For less serious crimes, the
punishment was banishment;26 and for petty crimes, the punishment was either corporal
punishment or fines.27 More importantly, these punishments were mandatory.28
This combination—harsh punishments strictly attached to particular offenses—
created two practical consequences: first, although in many instances the judge formally
imposed punishment, the judge’s lack of discretion meant the punishment was set de facto
by the jury’s verdict.29 Second, if juries believed the harsh punishments—especially
death—were not justified, they often refused to convict.30 These “pious perjuries,” as
Blackstone dubbed them (because the jury’s refusal to convict reflected a pious yet
perjurious violation of their oath), fostered a mistrust of juries among the Crown’s judges.31
Consequently, over the centuries, these king-made judges helped develop an English
common law that deprived juries of any formal sentencing authority.32 This English
common law followed American colonists to the new world. It was also this English
common law that many American states rejected.33
Enthusiasm for self-government and memories of arbitrary Crown-appointed judges
motivated many early American states to adopt jury sentencing.34 An expansion of
noncapital sentencing options—particularly made possible by the invention of the
penitentiary in 1790 by Pennsylvanian Quakers35—also reduced institutional fear of “pious
perjuries” and increased trust in oath-honoring juries.36 Indeed, it was a mistrust of elitist,
unelected judges that helped expand the use of jury sentencing even as memories of English
oppression faded.37 Although historical records of colonial sentencing practices are almost
supra note 22, at 37-38. Trial by ordeal typically required the accused to survive carrying hot irons or
walking over hot coals or to survive being thrown into a pond with their hands bound. VON MOSCHZISKER,
supra, § 49. The ordeal was banned by Pope Innocent III in 1215. JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL
BY JURY, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT § 28 (F.B. Rothman 1986) (1877).
24
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *98.
25
Id.
26
John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Jury: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 36-37 (1983).
27
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 584 (3d ed. 1990).
28
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *396.
29
THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH
CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800, at 98 (1985).
30
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *238-39.
31
Id.
32
See generally Hoffman, supra note 12, at 963; Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 310.
33
See Edward A. Linden, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 970-71 (1967); Craig Reese,
Jury Sentencing in Texas: Time for a Change, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 323, 326-27 (1990).
34
See Charles O. Betts, Jury Sentencing, 2 NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N J. 369, 370 (1956).
35
NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 4-5 (1974).
36
Hoffman, supra note 12, at 963-64. For example, in 1796, Virginia formally adopted jury sentencing for
all criminal offenses in the same reform legislation which adopted imprisonment as the punishment for a
variety of felonies. Act of Dec. 22, 1796, §§5-15, 1796 Va. Acts ch. 2.
37
EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 96-97 (1944). Hostility towards judges who
were unresponsive to the popular will grew throughout the nineteenth century, and many states adopted
jury sentencing in concert with the movement in the mid-to-late-1800s towards an elective judiciary. Id. at
80-135.
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nonexistent,38 it is clear that from 1800 to 1900 roughly half of all states used juries to
impose noncapital criminal sentences.39 Even in those states that did not employ jury
sentencing, strict determinative sentencing schemes allowed juries to indirectly dictate
sentencing through their verdict just like their English predecessors.40
American ideals throughout this era regarded juries as the epitome of decentralized
democracy.41 The jury, as a deliberative democratic institution, represented an essential
feature of self-government and a necessary check against unjust legislation and arbitrary
judicial power.42 In fact, during this era, the jury right was viewed not as a right of the
defendant but rather as a right of the community.43 In this vein, juries not only determined
matters of fact, but in partnership with judges, determined matters of law.44 It was not until
1895 that the Supreme Court declared questions of law to be outside the jury’s province.45
This change, however, signaled a shift in values. Thereafter, the twentieth century would
see an erosion of jury authority—and consequently, a decline of jury sentencing.46
By 1910, progressive beliefs in the possibility of rehabilitation began to prioritize
utilitarianism and legal expertise over retributivism and community wisdom.47 Legal
institutions viewed criminal law not as a system to punish criminals for their immoral acts
but rather as a system to cure them of their antisocial behavior. The idea that lay jurors
could administer these quasi-medical procedures appeared nonsensical.48 Instead,
Congress and state legislatures created a class of professional parole officers,
commissioners, and criminal justice experts to help in determining defendants’ actual
punishment.49 The rise of law schools and the professionalization of the bar further

38

Hoffman, supra note 12, at 963, n.43.
Wright, supra note 15, at 1373.
40
Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 319.
41
Letter from The Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1782), reprinted in 2 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 245, 249-50
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“It is essential in every free country, that common people should have a part
and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the legislative department . . . The trial by jury in the
judicial department and the collection of the people by their representatives in the legislature are those
fortunate inventions which have procured for them, in this country, their true proportion of influence . . .”).
42
Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, WIS. L. REV. 377, 395-96
(1999).
43
In 1930 the Supreme Court authorized defendants for the first time to waive jury trials and choose bench
trials, thereby implying that before then defendants were not the principal beneficiary of the jury system.
See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297-98 (1930).
44
Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 173 (1964). A legal
theory of natural law, which held that higher values intrinsic to human nature could be deduced and applied
independent of black-letter law, supported the predominant political philosophy of the eighteenth and earlynineteenth centuries. Id. at 172. Because natural law was thought to be accessible by ordinary people,
judges of this era frequently advised juries that they were not bound by the court’s instructions and could
judge the law themselves. Id. at 174. It was generally thought, however, that jurors would only disregard
court instructions in unusual cases. Id. at 172, n.15.
45
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102-03 (1895).
46
See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1510-11 (2001) (“The
number of jurisdictions that allowed any jury sentencing in non-capital cases dwindled by the midtwentieth century to thirteen states.”).
47
See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 16-17 (1998).
48
See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 965-66, n.55.
49
Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 326.
39

169

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2021

increased perception of disparate capabilities between lawyer and layman.50 In turn,
judges—equipped with criminologist-crafted pre-sentence reports and their own legal
expertise—assumed juries’ sentencing duties.51 By the 1970s, however, the rehabilitative
model was under attack.
The rehabilitative model’s attempts at individualized treatment of offenders
produced gross disparities between punishments issued to different defendants of similar
crimes.52 These disparities, it was perceived, were based in large part on judges’ ideological
or emotional dispositions.53 Additionally, the growth in violent crime in the late 1960s and
1970s prompted observers to question the feasibility of “curing” defendants.54 Thus,
retributivism returned to fashion.55 However, the chosen solution for unequal treatment
among defendants and the irrationality of some judicial decision making was not to return
to the collective wisdom of twelve impartial jurors; it was something else: math.56
By the 1980s, sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing laws became
popular among the states, and Congress followed suit with the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.57 These sentencing guidelines offered a form of predictable determinative sentencing
which could be applied even-handedly to all defendants.58 Just deserts were thus derived
not from moral judgments, but from legislatively enacted formulas that applied an array of
objective criteria to calculate punishment.59 And, of course, the pendulum swung. The
criminal justice community soon observed that not only were the guidelines unmoored
from community sentiment,60 but they were brutally inflexible.61 Truly individualized
punishment for defendants was a mirage, as the guidelines sharply constrained judicial
discretion.62 Under the guidelines, judges retained marginal leeway on how to apply
sentencing factors within formulaic constraints, but juries’ voices were excluded entirely.63
Enter Charles Apprendi.
In 2000, the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey was a major
turning point for jury sentencing power.64 The case centered on the sentencing of Charles
50

CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 3-28 (1980).
See Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 326-27.
52
See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 133 (1969).
53
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 23 (1973) (“The particular
defendant on some existential day confronts a specific judge. The occupant of the bench on that day may be
punitive, patriotic, self-righteous, guilt-ridden, and more than customarily dyspeptic.”).
54
Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 327.
55
See id. at 327-28.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 328-29.
58
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.).
59
See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1988).
60
Douglas R. Thomson & Anthony J. Ragona, Popular Moderation Versus Governmental
Authoritarianism: An Interactionist View of Public Sentiments Toward Criminal Sanctions, 33 CRIME &
DELINQ. 337, 354 (1987).
61
Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate
Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 63 (1993). Along with the establishing sentencing guidelines, most
sentencing reform efforts (including at the federal level) abolished parole. Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 329.
62
Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 329-30.
63
Id.
64
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
51
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Apprendi following his New Jersey conviction for unlawful firearm possession.65 In New
Jersey, this “second-degree” offense carried a punishment of five to ten years
imprisonment.66 However, at sentencing and in accordance with a separate New Jersey
“hate crime” statute, the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Apprendi’s “crime was motivated by racial bias.”67 This finding mandated an extended
term of ten to twenty years imprisonment, and the trial judge sentenced Apprendi to
twelve.68
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Stevens explained that due process and the impartial jury
trial right, taken together, require that any fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction)
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.69 Until this point, legislatures
were free to delineate between “elements” of an offense and “sentencing factors,” even
though the difference was purely semantic.70 Within this dichotomy, only elements needed
to be charged in the indictment and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt while
sentencing factors could be found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence. 71 Not
any longer. Because Apprendi’s judge—not his jury—found his second-degree offense to
be racially motivated (a sentencing factor that increased Apprendi’s penalty beyond the
statutory maximum), the extended term mandatorily applied to his conviction was
unconstitutional.72
Although Apprendi’s holding was limited to sentencing guideline factors that
increased the sentence beyond the statutory maximum, Apprendi’s progeny quickly
expanded its reach.73 Immediately after Apprendi, judges were still free to be the factfinders
for guideline-mandated sentencing factors that increased the sentence so long as the
increase stayed within the offense’s statutory limits.74 By 2004, however, the Court made
clear that the Sixth Amendment reserves to the jury the “function of finding the facts
essential to lawful imposition of the penalty.”75 Thus, “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the
penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt.”76 This meant that any increase invoked Apprendi protections, not just
65

Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 469.
67
Id. at 471.
68
Id. at 469, 471.
69
Id. at 468, 476-77, 490.
70
“[T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged. . . . [T]he applicability
of the reasonable-doubt standard . . . has always been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is
charged in any given case.” McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 21011, n. 12 (1977) (internal quotations removed).
71
Id. at 86.
72
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-92.
73
In Ring v. Arizona, the Court applied Apprendi to overrule Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990)—a
case upholding a capital sentencing system that permitted judges rather than juries to find the specific
aggravating factors justifying the imposition of death in capital sentencing proceedings. 536 U.S. at 588-89.
Additionally, although the Court in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), initially distinguished
between facts that increase a statutory maximum and facts that increase only a mandatory minimum, this
“inconsistency” was overruled in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).
74
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
75
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308-09 (2004).
76
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155 (emphasis added).
66
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those which exceeded statutory maxima. Judges were still able to exercise their discretion
(including considering evidence that was not admissible at trial) to impose sentences within
the range prescribed by statute; however, sentencing guidelines could no longer legally
compel a particular sentence based on any fact not found by the jury.77 This revelation
logically implied one of two results: either every aggravating fact inherent within
sentencing guidelines’ computational schemes would need to be tried before a jury (thereby
giving juries de facto control over sentences by way of their verdicts much as they had in
bygone eras) or the sentencing guidelines could no longer carry the force of law. The
Supreme Court chose the latter; sentencing guidelines became advisory.78
In a watershed moment for the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial, Apprendi
brought an end to more than two decades of determinate sentencing strictly controlled by
legislatures and mandatory sentencing guidelines. The void, however, was filled not by
juries but by expansive judicial discretion. Somewhere between when the penological
sciences of the rehabilitative era first displaced jury sentencing and when the cold
calculations of determinative sentencing proved unworkable, the criminal justice
community lost trust in the jury. A mere four years after Apprendi, the momentum towards
jury sentencing turned into nothing more than a swap-and-replace with judges. It is
important to note, however, that the Apprendi line of cases was never about jury sentencing.
It was simply about what sentencing-relevant facts the jury had to find while deciding guilt.
Criminal defendants do not have a right under the Sixth Amendment to have their sentences
imposed by juries.79 Interestingly, for most of our nation’s history, this fact was nothing
more than an unarticulated assumption.80 It was not until 1986 when the Supreme Court
first made it explicit (albeit with no significant historical discussion).81 Nevertheless,
remnants of jury sentencing survive to this day.82
This short history of jury sentencing serves two purposes. First, it demonstrates that
for jury sentencing advocates, the solution is statutory, not constitutional. The Sixth
Amendment of course does not bar expanded jury sentencing, but it surely will not be its
savior. Secondly, it shows that the decline of jury sentencing over the centuries has been
for reasons that alone do not settle the debate around jury sentencing. Jury sentencing
originated in America as a democratic check against judicial overreach and coercive state
power. It was abandoned for an experiment with utilitarian ideas of rehabilitation. That
experiment has since failed. Thus, today, the jury sentencing debate hinges exclusively on
policy.
77

Id. at 2163.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). The guidelines, even in advisory form, still retain
some legal significance. For instance, the standard for appellate review of sentences is unreasonableness,
Booker, 543 U.S. at 261, and a trial judge’s compliance with the guidelines affords their chosen sentence a
presumption of reasonableness, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 340 (2007).
79
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93.
80
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (“The Sixth Amendment never has been thought to
guarantee a right to a jury determination of that issue.”).
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McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93 (“[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the
sentence turns on specific findings of fact.”). As Judge Hoffman explains: “There was surprisingly little
discussion of the right to a jury trial in the records of the constitutional debates, let alone any discussion of
whether juries in criminal cases should continue the colonial practice of imposing sentences.” Hoffman,
supra note 12, at 967.
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B. Jury Sentencing Policy Arguments

Proponents of jury sentencing tend to be in the minority. The federal government
does not use juries for noncapital criminal sentencing, nor do forty-four of the fifty states.83
Although history explains the growth of judicial sentencing, it does not justify the distrust
of jury sentencing. Instead, resistance to jury sentencing is often supported by one of four
propositions regarding jury competence: (1) jurors are more susceptible to prejudice than
judges; (2) jury sentences are less uniform than those imposed by judges; (3) juries are
harsher than judges; and (4) jury sentencing encourages compromise verdicts.84
While these criticisms of jury competence remain debatable, the question of their
veracity is largely irrelevant to this Note’s proposal. The criminal advisory jury proposal,
as will be discussed in Part III, results in nothing more than a non-binding sentencing
recommendation. So, even if juries are truly more biased, inconsistent, or harsher than
judges, the design mitigates these risks by preserving judicial sentencing autonomy.
Similarly, additional procedural safeguards of the design address the concern that jury
sentencing will encourage compromise verdicts. These procedural safeguards are also
explained in Part III.
Although the criticisms of jury sentencing do not apply with equal force to criminal
advisory juries, they do represent prevailing viewpoints. For this reason, it is worthwhile
to address counterpoints. The first criticism regards the susceptibility of juries to prejudice.
Any claim that juries are susceptible to prejudice requires acknowledging that judges are
too. The rejection of the rehabilitative model in the 1970s was, in part, due to its perceived
vulnerability to judicial prejudice.85 Of course, the criticism is not that judges are
insusceptible to prejudice, it is that they are less susceptible than juries. However, social
science does not support this notion.
For instance, following Alabama’s abandonment of jury sentencing in 1978, one
study compared the disparity between judge and jury sentences for robbery convictions.
Researchers found no statistically significant race-based differences existed.86 Another
study examined ordinary people’s views on appropriate punishment for actual crimes.87
The study compared these views across different racial, gender, and educational groups
and found that while different groups held different views on punishment, views within
each group were remarkably consistent.88 The implication is that the risk of prejudice from
one person, whose membership in a particular group may skew his or her viewpoint, may
be less than the risk of prejudice from twelve people, whose memberships in different
groups will force them to accommodate different viewpoints.
The second criticism regards jury inconsistency. The proposition is that jury
sentencing is less uniform and hence more unpredictable than judicial sentencing. Here,
the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Studies directly addressing the question have
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See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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Brent L. Smith & Edward H. Stevens, Sentence Disparity and the Judge-Jury Sentencing Debate: An
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88
Id.
84

173

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2021

achieved mixed results.89 At the very least, however, these studies do not bolster the claim
that jury sentencing results in significantly more inconsistency than judicial sentencing.90
Although a comparison of sentencing among all juries with sentencing among all judges
is inconclusive, it is fair to presume that sentencing from an individual judge is more
consistent (considering an individual jury never hears more than one case).91 Thus, the
more pressing questions policymakers face are: one, what is the right balance between
consistency and individualized treatment; and two, what level of consistency warrants
exclusion of community participation.
Finally, the third criticism regards jury harshness. Again, the proposition is that jury
sentences are harsher than judge sentences. Research, again, reveals this to be specious.
Quantitative comparisons of judge and jury sentence lengths must account for disparities
between judge and jury sentencing procedures. In other words, a longer sentence may result
not from a jury’s harsher propensity, but from informational and power inequities between
judge and jury.92 For instance, juries in some states are not authorized the full range of
sentencing options available to judges, such as probation or community service.93 Juries
are also not always provided accurate information about parole eligibility and thus may
overestimate release probabilities.94 Further, in some jury sentencing jurisdictions,
statutory minimum sentences bind juries while not binding judges.95 All of these disparities
increase the likelihood that a jury sentence will be harsher than a judge sentence.96
Although jury sentences may be harsher than judge sentences for the reasons stated
above, a large body of empirical evidence suggests that actual jurors are more lenient than
judges.97 One observer explains:
Researchers who delve more deeply than general survey and poll
questions have discovered a paradox: When asked about sentencing in the
abstract, citizens report a desire for harsher penalties, but when presented
with detailed descriptions of cases, these same citizens often suggest more
lenient penalties than those meted out by judges and, in many cases, than
the mandatory minimum sanctions currently in force in their
jurisdictions.98
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Adriaan Lanni, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108
YALE L.J. 1796-97 & n.100 (1999).
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Id. But see Smith, supra note 86, at 1 (concluding that “while states utilizing judge sentencing gave more
consistent sentences from 1957 to 1977, recent trends indicate that the disparity in judge sentencing has
risen to a level that approximates the disparity in jury-imposed sentences”).
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See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 987-88.
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Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 885, 888 (2004).
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Id. at 900.
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Id. at 899.
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Id. at 911.
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Id. at 888-89.
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See BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN & EDIE GREENE, THE JURY UNDER FIRE: MYTH, CONTROVERSY, AND REFORM
286 (2017); Shari Seidman Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency in Sentencing, 7
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73, 74-81 (1989); Hoffman, supra note 12, at 988-89; Lanni, supra note 89, at 1793-94.
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The reason for this phenomenon, as behavioral research shows, is that laymen
systematically misperceive the seriousness of the typical crime for a particular offense.99
This misperception is caused in part by a media bias toward reporting the most heinous
crimes and in part by a natural psychological tendency—known as the “availability
heuristic”—that leads subjects to recall more easily stories of atypically severe crimes.100
So, there is a disconnect between the public’s general call for harsher penalties and
citizens’ more lenient response when confronted with specific crimes. Unfortunately, this
public call translates into an electoral preference for officials who are “tough on crime”
and incentivizes legislative overenthusiasm for harsh punishment.101 The ultimate result is
a sentencing scheme that is—from the perspective of citizens sitting in the jury box—
overly severe.102
To illustrate, consider a study by United States District Judge James Gwin of the
Northern District of Ohio. Postulating that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were not
reflective of community sentiment, Judge Gwin surveyed jurors in twenty-two criminal
cases following their return of a guilty verdict.103 Judge Gwin asked each juror individually
to recommend a punishment for the defendant they just convicted.104 Out of 261 total
responses, 229 jurors (88%) recommended a sentence below the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines’ minimum for the offense.105 In fact, the jurors’ recommended sentence was on
average less than half of the Guidelines’ minimum sentence and a third of the Guidelines’
maximum.106 Interestingly, jurors’ average recommended sentences were only longer than
the Guidelines’ recommended sentence in white-collar cases.107
These white-collar cases involved criminal offenses akin to the following. In
November 2019, a jury convicted Roger Stone—a longtime Republican operative and
friend of President Donald Trump—of seven felony counts, including lying to authorities,
obstructing a congressional investigation, and witness intimidation.108 In accordance with
sentencing guidelines, federal prosecutors recommended a sentence of seven to nine years
in prison.109 Before a sentence was imposed, however, President Trump publicly decried
the recommended sentence as politically motivated and overly harsh.110 This instigated a
national controversy, prompted the United States Attorney General to personally intervene
and overrule his prosecutors’ recommendation, and led some to publicly accuse the judge
99
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in the case of being a Democratic activist (along with calls for her impeachment).111
Ultimately, the judge—United States District Judge Amy Berman Jackson of the District
of Columbia—imposed a three-and-a-half-year sentence.112 Yet, in the midst of the furor,
at no point while Judge Jackson, the prosecutors, President Trump, and the national media
were debating the fairness of Roger Stone’s sentence was the jury in the case asked what
sentence they would consider fair. It presents an interesting hypothetical as to how the
opinion of twelve anonymous citizens, affected only through civic duty and undistracted
by extrinsic concerns, may have depoliticized the sentencing and quelled the public
turmoil.
In summary, although juries may issue harsher sentences than judges, this has less to
do with punitive preferences and more to do with procedural sentencing disparities.
Meanwhile, the notion that individual jurors are overly harsh is a myth. More disturbingly,
both sentencing statutes and judicial sentences are largely detached, if not divergent, from
community preference. Juries are inherently better than judges at reflecting the conscience
of the community and expressing public outrage for the transgression of community norms.
Yet today, in the vast majority of jurisdictions, juries have no say in sentencing. Defending
herself against public accusations of unfairness in the Roger Stone case, Judge Jackson
scoffed, saying “[T]he guidelines are harsh. I can assure you that defense attorneys and
many judges have been making that point for a long time, but we don’t usually succeed in
getting the government to agree.”113 Juries, on the other hand, may well agree. Thus, it is
this Note’s contention that judges should start asking their opinion.
II.

HOW JURIES ARE CURRENTLY USED IN AN ADVISORY FORM

Per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a formal advisory jury is a jury impaneled
to provide a judge with non-binding recommendations in civil cases where the parties are
not otherwise entitled to a jury.114 In practice, judges use formal advisory juries in
exceptional cases to either affect procedural consistency or solicit community input.115
However, other informal forms of advisory juries also exist. For instance, in the six states
that use juries for noncapital criminal sentencing, all states but Texas allow the judge to
override the jury sentence.116 Kentucky, for example, expressly holds their jury sentences

Scott Morefield, Tucker Carlson Calls for Roger Stone Judge's Impeachment: “Democratic Activist
Wearing Robes,” THE DAILY CALLER (Feb. 20, 2020, 10:21 PM),
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See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-107 (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.070 (West 1974); MO. ANN.
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to be non-binding.117 Because ultimate judicial control is preserved in these states, their
jury sentences are, in effect, advisory.
Additionally, in rare cases, juries have also contributed to sentencing decisions in
more unorthodox ways. In these cases, judges act outside express procedural authority to
either direct jury sentencing participation (e.g., by polling juries’ opinions)118 or tolerate it
(e.g., by permitting jury statements at sentencing hearings).119 Either way, the juries only
provide advice. Accounting for these instances, as well as the formal advisory jury and
non-binding state sentencing practices, a broad definition of an advisory jury includes any
jury whose decisions on trial questions are not given determinative effect but are solicited
or offered to guide a judge’s ultimate adjudication.
With that definition in mind, an examination of the current practices of advisory
juries (at least of those forms relevant to sentencing)120 will be helpful in developing a form
suitable for use in noncapital criminal sentencing. This Part begins that examination with
a discussion of the civil advisory jury, followed by an analysis of state jury sentencing in
felony trials, and ends with a few examples of when informal advisory juries may arise in
criminal sentencing. Building on this discussion, Part III follows with recommendations
for a formal advisory jury suited for noncapital criminal sentencing.
A. Civil Advisory Juries
Rule 39(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]n all actions not
triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue
with an advisory jury . . .”121 Thus, in civil trials when the Seventh Amendment does not
afford litigants a jury right,122 the court has the option to impanel an advisory jury. The
practice is not a modern innovation; the use of advisory juries in civil court extends as far
back as the fourteenth century.123 Historically, juries only served as formal fact finders in
courts of law; however, in courts of equity, chancellors could impanel an advisory jury to
assist in deciding cases.124 Upon the merger of law and equity in 1937, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure formally adopted the advisory jury,125 and most states have since
followed suit.126
See Murphy v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Ky. 2001) (stating that a jury’s sentencing
recommendation has no mandatory effect).
118
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Today, as it was historically, an advisory verdict from a civil advisory jury is not
binding upon the court,127 but “is only part of the data taken into consideration in arriving
at the court's independent conclusion.”128 When an advisory jury is used, the case is still
formally tried before the judge, who must enter findings of both law and fact.129 The
decision to use an advisory jury, as well as their management once impaneled, is not subject
to any formal constraints or guidelines.130 Thus, given that a judge has absolute discretion
to call, manage, and disregard a civil advisory jury, the advisory jury presents essentially
no issues for appellate review.131 For these reasons, judges are not obligated to (and rarely
do) explain why they are calling civil advisory juries in the first place.132
Although judges are not required to explain their rationale for impaneling an
advisory jury, the practice is generally utilized for two reasons: procedural consistency or
community involvement.133 The first rationale—procedural consistency—may be present
when the line between law and equity is seen as arbitrary, irrationally resulting in a jury
right for legal controversies but not for analogous equitable controversies.134 For instance,
a jury right would exist in a legal action stemming from a contract dispute, but not for an
equitable action stemming from a deed or promissory note.135 Also, an action for damages
would confer a jury right if the case was brought in a court of law but not for the same
action brought in an admiralty court.136 In these situations, advisory juries may be desirable
as a means to affect procedural consistency. Advisory juries may also provide consistency
(and avoid disparate treatment of co-defendants) in complex cases involving co-defendants
with common evidence but unequal jury rights (e.g., if a private party and the United States
government were joined as co-defendants).137
The second rationale—community involvement—may be present when community
opinion is sought to support rulings in highly-charged litigation.138 An example of this is
the civil lawsuit brought in the wake of the 1993 tragedy in Waco, Texas.139 The infamous
incident involved a siege by federal law enforcement agents of a compound owned by cult
leader David Koresh.140 As law enforcement attempted to breach the compound, it caught
Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U.S. 238, 240 (1893) (“But such verdict is not binding upon the judgment of the
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fire.141 The flames quickly engulfed the entire structure and resulted in the deaths—all
televised on national media—of nearly eighty men, women, and children.142 The
subsequent lawsuit sought damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which authorized
suit against the United States but forbade the jury right in such actions.143 Although the
trial was a bench trial, due to the publicity the incident received and the controversy and
public outrage it spawned, the federal district judge impaneled an advisory jury per Rule
39(c) as a means to legitimize the judge’s ruling.144 Ultimately, both the judge and the
advisory jury held the United States not liable for any of the deaths.145
Although the advisory verdict is not binding on the court, the use of an advisory jury
is not without consequence. Compared to a bench trial, jury trials impose additional
procedural costs that cause increased delays and expenses for the court and litigants
alike.146 For instance, jury trials must be conducted in one continuous block of time
whereas bench trials may be scheduled in segments around a court’s other business.147
Jurors require voir dire, and once selected, induce logistical complications associated with
managing them.148 Moreover, the nature of the trial itself changes when a jury—even an
advisory one—is involved. Without a jury, the presentation of evidence can be streamlined,
and the rules of evidence are typically less contentious.149 Opening and closing statements
are not needed and some live testimony may be replaced by written form.150 Further,
because a jury is a materially different audience than a trial judge, court presentations are
approached differently by counsel.151 This holds true even when the jury is only advisory
given that attorneys recognize the advisory jury’s persuasive force.152 By some estimates,
these additional procedural considerations cause a trial to run twice as long with a jury than
with a judge alone.153 And, although made-for-jury presentations are not inherently worse
than made-for-judge presentations, the simple fact that there is a change demonstrates that
the advisory jury, despite being subject to the judge’s absolute control and discretion, is
not inconsequential at trial.154
In addition to the procedural consequences of advisory juries, there are substantive
risks associated with using an advisory jury.155 First, with knowledge that their advisory
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verdict is optional and non-determinative, juries may become apathetic to their duties.156
In theory, an advisory jury who believes their decision lacks consequence may deliberate
or consider less before reaching a verdict. This perception of the advisory jury as apathetic
to its duties undermines an advisory’s persuasive force. It also delegitimizes any verdict
from a judge perceived to have been swayed by the advisory.157 Second, advisory jurors
who perceive their role as unnecessary or irrelevant may become disillusioned with their
personal sacrifice to serve. Asking jurors to take off work or arrange child care merely to
give non-binding advice risks stirring public resentment for jury duty in general.158 Finally,
advisory juries always introduce an additional risk for judges who may ultimately have to
rule against them.159 Most judges are surely not eager to openly disregard community
viewpoints in a case after voluntarily soliciting them.160
In summary, as just one, non-binding factor a judge may consider to independently
decide a case, the civil advisory jury is a useful way to solicit community input without
relinquishing any judicial decision-making authority. And, when the actual verdict and the
advisory verdict are aligned, civil advisory juries help legitimize the outcome. However,
this comes at the cost of significant procedural inefficiencies—the same inefficiencies, at
least to some extent, that are present in regular jury trials. Further, the non-binding nature
of the advisory verdict creates risks that jurors will be less thorough in their duties and less
appreciative of serving. And, when actual verdicts and advisory verdicts end up not
aligning, a civil advisory jury may do more harm than good to the legal system’s
legitimacy.
B. States with Noncapital Criminal Jury Sentencing
Only six states allow for jury sentencing in noncapital felony cases: Arkansas,
Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.161 In all of these jurisdictions, juries
select their sentence from within a legislatively defined statutory range, which in some
cases can be permissively broad.162 Beyond this, the particulars of each states’ sentencing
structure vary widely. Professors Nancy King and Rosevelt Noble summarize these
variations:
156
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[S]tates differ as to whether or not trial is bifurcated into guilt and
punishment phases; whether or not the prosecutor can veto a defendant's
choice to be sentenced by a judge instead of jury; whether or not judicial
sentencing is bounded by sentencing guidelines; which felony offenses and
offenders may be sentenced by juries; which sentencing options are
available to jurors; whether or not the sentences that juries impose are
subject to parole; and what information jurors are permitted to learn about
punishment options, the offense, and the offender.163
Evaluations of state jury sentencing schemes frequently involve comparisons of judge and
jury sentences;164 and the variations that King and Noble summarize distort these
comparisons.165 Regardless, for the purposes of this Note, it is not necessary to analyze in
detail the various procedures used to implement jury sentencing and their consequences.
Instead, three generalizations suffice: first, in some states that use juries to sentence in
noncapital cases, jury sentences are viewed as harsher than judge sentences;166 second, in
these same states, judges retain the authority to modify jury sentences;167 and third, these
judges rarely do.168 Thus, for an advisory jury proposal premised on the retention of
independent judicial decision-making authority, the relevant issue is why judges do not
exercise their discretion to correct harsh jury sentences.
One reason may be the default effect. In five of the six states that allow jury
sentencing, a jury’s sentence forms the presumptive ruling.169 However, the procedural
requirements to overcome this presumption are not necessarily prohibitive. In Virginia, for
instance, if a judge wants to modify a jury sentence, the judge “shall file with the record of
the case a written explanation of such modification including the cause therefor.”170 In
Arkansas it is even easier. There, the trial court may reduce a jury’s sentence without
providing written justification.171 And in Kentucky, the fact that the jury sentence is
characterized as non-binding implicates unbounded judicial authority to depart from it.172
Yet, despite the relative procedural ease with which a judge may modify a jury sentence,173
doing so still requires some additional cognitive effort. This effort creates a psychological
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inertia (often referred to the “default effect” or nudge theory)174 to sticking with the default;
in this case, whatever the jury decided.
While judges may be subconsciously inclined to stick with the default, another
explanation of why they rarely modify jury sentences is that they consciously favor
deference. Judges in some jury sentencing states see the jury as perfectly capable of
deciding the sentencing question.175 Others view jury sentencing as “a welcome respite
from a morally uncomfortable chore.”176 Alternatively, elected judges face the pressure of
upsetting their electorate and are therefore cautious of public perception.177 These judges
may be afraid of appearing “soft on crime” by lowering a jury sentence or may simply
believe that jury deference helps maintain a positive community reputation.178
Hypothetically in these environments, a newspaper headline along the lines of “Judge Cuts
Assailant’s Jury Sentence in Half” would understandably be unwelcome attention.179
One final explanation for the lack of judicial modification is that the jury
sentence—or more accurately, the threat of a harsh jury sentence—helps manage the court
docket. The theory is that without the prospect of severe jury sentences, the perceived risk
of jury trial will decrease, consequently decreasing plea rates, and jury trials will
overwhelm the court.180 Thus, on principle and in order to disincentivize jury trials, judges
may refuse to modify jury sentences to effectively discourage defendants from believing
the judge will fix a jury’s harsh sentence if their choice to seek a jury trial turns out poor.181
The lack of judicial modification in jury sentencing states may therefore be
explained by any combination of (1) a cognitive ease leading judges to accept the jury
sentence as the default, (2) a preference for jury deference for either principled reasons
(jurors are better suited to decide normative questions) or pragmatic ones (to avoid
upsetting an electorate), and (3) docket management incentives. Of course, modification
174
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may also be rare because it is not necessary, i.e., because jury sentences are commensurate
with judge sentences.182 The proposals advanced here, however, deliberately avoid resting
on that argument. The proposal for a criminal advisory jury instead must address the
foregoing impediments to judicial modification, even if the problem modification is meant
to address is itself exceptionally rare.
C. Informal Advisory Juries Used in Criminal Sentencing
Beyond the few states that already include juries in an advisory form in their
criminal sentencing procedures, criminal advisory juries occasionally occur in judge-only
sentencing schemes. On these occasions, the form the advisory jury takes is defined by a
particular judge’s idiosyncratic preference or the circumstances in which the jury’s advice
originates. Beyond the idea that these instances are completely dependent on a judge’s
proactive initiation or willing concession, generalizations are difficult to make because the
instances are rare and take on a variety of forms. Nevertheless, two anecdotes are
instructive for conceiving the contours of a formal criminal advisory jury.
The first case involves a federal district judge proactively surveying a criminal jury
for a recommended sentence. In United States v. Collins, federal prosecutors appealed a
sentence based on the district judge’s use of a jury poll following the conclusion of the
trial.183 The case involved the conviction of a Dayton, Ohio man whose confiscated
computer was found to include nineteen videos and ninety-three images of child
pornography.184 The jury found the defendant guilty of both possession and distribution of
child pornography, and the defendant’s calculated sentencing guidelines range was twentytwo to twenty-seven years (above the statutory twenty-year maximum for the offenses).185
After the verdict but before the sentencing, however, the judge
polled the jury to ask them . . . “State what you believe an appropriate
sentence is.” Jurors' responses ranged from zero to 60 months' incarceration,
with a mean of 14.5 months and median of 8 months. With one exception,
every juror recommended a sentence less than half of the five-year
mandatory minimum accompanying defendant's offenses. . . . [T]he district
judge considered the jury poll as “one factor” in fashioning defendant's
sentence, noting that it “reflect[s] . . . how off the mark the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are.” After discussing numerous [other] sentencing
factors, . . . the district judge varied downward, sentencing defendant to
concurrent mandatory minimum terms of five years' imprisonment.186
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the sentence.187 In doing so, the circuit reasoned that
although the district judge cited just desert as the most important sentencing factor, the
judge also considered the defendant's lack of prior convictions, absence of alcohol or drug
182
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abuse, college degree, regular employment, close family ties, and financial responsibility
as factors supporting a lighter sentence.188 Ultimately, the court held that because the jury
recommendation was in no way controlling—it “did not conflict with the district judge’s
duty or ability to . . . independently craft an appropriate sentence”—the sentence was not
substantively unreasonable.189
A second case provides a valuable juxtaposition. In State v. Mahoney, the defendant,
charged with first-degree murder for shooting and killing his father, claimed he suffered
from battered child syndrome as a consequence of his father’s physical and emotional
abuse.190 Based in part on sympathy for the defendant, the jury returned a verdict
convicting the defendant of a lesser charge of first-degree aggravated manslaughter.191
Along with the verdict, however, two individual jurors also wrote letters to both the judge
and the defendant indicating their preference that the defendant receive therapy instead of
punishment and their desire to read a statement at sentencing.192 The judge permitted the
jurors to read the statement at sentencing and the State appealed.193 In reversing the trial
judge for abuse of discretion, the appellate division clarified that it is a permissible exercise
of discretion to allow defense family members or victims to speak at sentencing.194
However, the jurors had no relevant information to add for judicial consideration because
they were limited to addressing the same evidence presented in front of the judge at trial.195
Further, allowing the jurors to speak at sentencing and to advocate for aggravating or
mitigating factors undermined their role as fact finders.196
In both Collins and Mahoney, the trial judge permitted the jury to voice their views
on appropriate punishment despite having no formal role in sentencing. In Collins, the jury
participation was permissible; but in Mahoney, it was reversable error. The opposite
outcomes reflect stark differences in how the informal jury advisories were issued. The
jury poll in Collins was conducted immediately following the verdict, and it simply
recommended a length of incarceration. It included neither juror commentary on
alternative, rehabilitative punishment nor expressions of empathy for either the defendant
or victim.197 Because of this, the juror opinions could reasonably be characterized as the
jury’s assessment of just desert for the criminal conduct presented at trial, free of influence
from aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors. The trial judge in Collins was able to
weigh this indication of just desert with the information presented at sentencing in order to
come to an independent conclusion.198 The juror recommendation permitted in Mahoney,
on the other hand, did not focus on retribution for the criminal conduct. Rather, the
recommendation was an alternative opinion speaking directly to the defendant’s mitigating
factors.199 Thus, instead of weighing the recommendation as one factor in sentencing, the
188
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trial judge in Mahoney was impermissibly influenced by particular jurors’ impassioned
pleas on how the judge himself should weigh the mitigating factors. Notably, the Collins
poll also represented opinions from each individual juror, whereas only two of the twelve
jurors spoke at sentencing in Mahoney.200
Of the two cases, Collins clearly represents the preferred lodestar for developing a
criminal advisory jury. In Collins, community sentiment was solicited to form one factor
in the judge’s independent sentencing decision without fundamentally changing any
procedural aspect of the trial or sentencing hearing. The Collins example, however, is not
without fault. First, the cursory juror poll conducted in Collins shares the same risk of juror
apathy that is present with civil advisory juries. Second, simply averaging individual juror
responses is an inherently weaker decision-making product than a product of juror
deliberation and collective agreement. For instance, the act of deliberation, by merging
different juror viewpoints, backgrounds, and experiences, reduces individual juror biases,
increases overall jury comprehension of evidence and court instructions (thereby resulting
in more accurate factfinding), and generates legitimacy for the jury’s decision.201 Finally,
because the informal advisory sentence in Collins was only made possible through the
judge’s personal initiative, there is little reason to believe that the practice will become
widespread. Only by formalizing the criminal advisory jury will its use become normalized
and its potential systematic benefits become possible. Thus, the recommendations in the
succeeding Part aim to address these deficiencies.
III.

PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF THE CRIMINAL ADVISORY JURY

This Note now turns to the proposal for a formal criminal advisory jury for use in
noncapital sentencing. The previous examples of advisory juries guide the discussion by
illustrating the vices and virtues of analogous systems. This Part proceeds by first
discussing when within the normal criminal process a criminal advisory jury should be
used and the benefits such deliberate placement will afford. The discussion then moves to
how a court should facilitate an advisory sentence and subsequently how a jury should
deliberate on one. Finally, the benefits of the criminal advisory jury are summarized,
including the benefits which will derive even if the prediction that an advisory sentence
will influence (but not control) a judge-made sentence proves false.
A. The Advisory Sentence’s Place in the Criminal Process
The starting point for the proposal is a discussion of when within the normal criminal
process the criminal advisory jury should be used. As alluded to at the end of Part II, this
Note proposes that the criminal advisory jury become a formal, automatic feature of all
noncapital jury trials. The criminal advisory jury is not, however, an additional jury. It is
merely a new role regular criminal juries should play following their issuance of a guilty
verdict. Unlike the civil advisory jury, which is optionally impaneled in cases where the
civil jury right does not exist, the criminal advisory jury should be a feature attached to the
200
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criminal jury right. In this vein, the criminal advisory jury should not be waivable during
jury trials, nor should it be available during bench trials (as is the case with civil advisory
juries when no jury right exists). This will ensure that, when a defendant seeks a jury trial,
the criminal advisory jury is used consistently throughout the jurisdiction and, when a
defendant seeks a bench trial, the court is not procedurally burdened with managing a jury
it is not already otherwise managing.
Crucially, the point in the trial process in which criminal juries should advise on the
sentence is after the verdict but before the sentencing hearing. Isolating the jury from the
normal sentencing hearing serves many key functions. First, by dismissing the jury
following the verdict, the sentencing hearing itself may remain unchanged. The current
practice of scheduling the sentencing hearing a couple of weeks from the conclusion of
trial affords the court time to develop a pre-sentencing report and affords each party time
to marshal the elements of its case which were inadmissible during trial. This delay would
be administratively prohibitive if the jury were to remain impaneled through the end of the
sentencing hearing.202
Second, the information presented at the sentencing hearing would unduly
complicate the jury’s role. Experience from capital sentencing shows that the weighing of
mitigating and aggravating factors is often one of the most befuddling tasks for a jury.203
In capital cases, these factors are weighed in order to determine whether a death sentence
is just desert.204 In noncapital cases, however, the sentencing factors tend to serve more
utilitarian purposes.205 A judge may use sentencing information to assess the rehabilitative
or deterrent effect of incarceration and evaluate whether alternative forms of punishment,
such as parole, electronic monitoring, or community service, are appropriate.206 A judge’s
institutional knowledge of these forms of alternative punishment and his or her first-hand
experience overseeing their use with a variety of defendants places the judge in a superior
position to consider them.207 On the other hand, a jury, as the conscience of the community,
is best positioned to decide just desert for the particular criminal acts committed.208 If the
jury’s advisory sentence is characterized as just desert for the crime rather than for the
criminal, the advisory sentence will be more readily comparable across different cases and
the information presented at the sentencing hearing will not be needed for the advisory
sentence’s determination. Thus, isolating the advisory sentence from influence by
mitigating and aggravating circumstances not only simplifies the jury’s task, but helps to
establish a retributivist baseline for the underlying crime.
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Third, by intentionally removing the jury from the sentencing hearing, the advisory
sentence will be more readily treated as merely one factor to be weighed by the judge,
rather than a separate decision a judge must accept or rebut. Because the jury’s picture of
the circumstances is necessarily incomplete, it prevents the advisory sentence, through
either judicial ease or deference, from becoming the de facto sentence. Surely it would be
an abuse of discretion for a judge to rely solely on an advisory sentence proposed without
the benefit of a sentencing hearing. In this sense, the advisory sentence will be more akin
to the jury poll used in Collins and far less resistant to judicial modification than jury
sentences in the state sentencing schemes previously discussed.
B. Facilitating the Advisory Sentence
Arguably the most important feature of this proposal is how the advisory sentence
will be issued. Although the advisory sentence is to be issued prior to the sentencing
hearing, it should not be issued contemporaneously with the verdict. Instead, the verdict
and advisory sentence should be issued separately but in immediate succession by the same
jury. Bifurcating the deliberation of guilt and punishment is an important feature in current
jury sentencing schemes designed to prevent facts relevant only to punishment from unduly
influencing decisions on guilt.209 Even though the jury will not participate in the sentencing
hearing, dividing jury decisions on guilt and punishment into two separate deliberations
remains beneficial. On this point, Mahoney provides insight. In that case, the jury issued a
compromise verdict: rather than finding for murder, the jury convicted on a lesser charge
of manslaughter in order to accommodate the sympathies of (at least) two jurors.210 Thus,
even though the Mahoney jury played no role in sentencing, the consequences of a murder
conviction weighed heavily on their finding of guilt. Simply asking juries to ignore
punishment while deciding guilt is not sufficient to prevent jury contemplation—even
speculative contemplation—of a guilty verdict’s consequences. Jury nullification arises out
of this same reality. In the rare cases of jury nullification, juries deliberately subvert the
truth to declare a defendant not guilty because they disagree with the anticipated
punishment.
In truth, juries think about punishment while deciding guilt regardless of any formal
role in sentencing.211 Bifurcating the verdict and the advisory sentence into two separate
deliberations helps mitigate this fact. If, during guilt deliberation, jurors could anticipate
having a chance to voice their thoughts on punishment, their concerns about the
consequences of a conviction could comfortably be set aside while they dispassionately
evaluate guilt. The Mahoney jury may have been less inclined to bend the truth by finding
for manslaughter instead of murder if it had known they could recommend a sentence
209
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commensurate with their moral understanding of the offense. Thus, jury compromises
during the guilt stage should decrease if jurors are given the opportunity to voice their
views on punishment separately.
Additionally, bifurcation simplifies jury deliberation. Jury instructions are a wellrecognized source of jury confusion.212 Although it is intuitive to believe additional
sentence-relevant instructions added onto the initial conviction-relevant instructions will
increase the likelihood that juries will further misunderstand their duties, empirical studies
suggest that longer instructions merely correlate with longer deliberations, not increased
confusion.213 Nevertheless, issuing sentencing instructions separate from the conviction
instructions can minimize instruction-based confusion.214
Some transparency in the initial conviction instructions will convey to the jury that
it will indeed have a role in sentencing if sentencing becomes necessary.215 For instance, a
statement at the end of the conviction instructions might read:
If you return a guilty verdict, then and only then, you will be asked by the
court to immediately return to the deliberation room and provide a statement
of what punishment you feel is appropriate for the crime committed. Further
instruction will be given at that time. Until that time, your focus should
remain on applying the law to the facts and objectively evaluating guilt. Any
discussion or consideration of appropriate punishment should be saved for
the separate sentencing deliberation if indeed the determination of a
sentence becomes necessary due to a finding of guilt.
Such an instruction will convey to the jury that it will have an opportunity to voice
sentiments on punishment without muddying the task at hand: deciding guilt. The
instructions that eventually preempt the advisory sentence deliberation should instruct
juries to recommend, at a minimum, a term length of actual incarceration. Juries may
additionally recommend an alternative, non-custodial sentence (or a sentence comprised of
both custodial and non-custodial elements). However, this alternative should be offered
along with, not in lieu of, incarceration. For example, if a jury’s preferred punishment is
community service, the instructions should require the jury to also recommend a
commensurate prison sentence, even if a diminutive term length is necessary to reflect the
jury’s preferences. This instruction—requiring juries to recommend a purely custodial
sentence irrespective of their non-custodial preference—ensures that each advisory
sentence will translate to uniform, quantifiable terms comparable across all cases. The
judge may then incorporate both the absolute and relative import of the jury’s
recommendation into his or her own final sentencing decision.
The question remains of how exactly a jury is expected to come up with a number
that represents just desert. Setting aside the fact that civil juries are trusted to do exactly
that when courts ask them to determine punitive damages, there is a real concern that
Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury
Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1605 (2012).
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without guidance or experience in sentencing, a jury’s recommendation will be erratic,
inconsistent, or random.216 These concerns highlight why the advisory sentence must be
non-binding. Regardless, one solution would be to provide the jury the same sentencing
guidelines that the judge receives (albeit in simplified form). This idea, however, as well
as any alternative that provides the jury with guidance, risks tainting the advisory sentence
with anchoring bias—a cognitive effect that biases decision-making toward initial pieces
of information.217 Because the advisory jury is intended to represent the conscience of the
community, principled adherence to the idea that their sentence should be based on nothing
more than their conscience is crucial. This blank-slate approach might sound arbitrary, but
sentencing guidelines themselves include the same subjective value judgements, just from
a different source.218 And, if advisory jury sentences are ever intended to validate
sentencing guidelines, the guidelines cannot form the basis for their own validation.
Finally, the additional sentencing deliberation will no doubt impose additional time
commitments on the court, although it is only speculation as to how significant this
additional time may be. One could argue that after a jury has settled on a unanimous
decision of guilt, any further deliberation by the same jury to propose an advisory sentence
will be relatively undemanding, especially because the jury is not being asked to consider
any new information not already presented to it at trial. Still, a jury that hangs while
attempting to decide on an advisory sentence would be rather vexing to a court given that
the advisory sentence is only that: advisory. One solution to mitigate the potential for a
hung jury at the advisory sentencing stage is to allow the advisory sentence to be less than
unanimous.219
Requiring only a 10-2 or 11-1 consensus rather than a unanimous consensus on
appropriate punishment will expedite the sentencing deliberation.220 Furthermore, the jury
will have the ability to exclude a juror who is exceptionally harsh or exceptionally
lenient.221 In other words, the advisory sentence will not have to skew to accommodate
lone wild cards (to reiterate, the guilt decision still requires unanimous agreement). In some
216
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sense, this non-unanimous scheme does risk undermining the advisory sentence’s
mitigating effect on compromise verdicts. For example, under the proposed scheme, a
would-be hold-out juror who may otherwise wish to nullify at the guilt stage may be
dissuaded from doing so by the prospect of the opportunity to offer a correspondingly
diminutive advisory sentence. If, however, that hold-out understands that the other jurors
are not beholden to accommodate their exceptional sentencing viewpoint by way of a nonunanimous decision rule, nullification is re-incentivized. For this reason, the fact that the
sentencing decision will not need to be unanimous should be kept from the jury until the
sentencing instructions are issued.222
C. Summary of Primary and Secondary Benefits
The core concept of the criminal advisory jury is that it is not binding on the court.
Thus, it allows for community sentiment to be expressed through a punishment
recommendation while preserving the traditional judicial authority in doling out sentences.
Excluding the advisory jury from the normal sentencing hearing will help cast its advisory
sentence as just desert for the crime—one factor a judge may consider to form his or her
independent sentencing decision—and help allay concern that the advisory sentence will
become the de facto sentence. Bifurcating the jury’s duties into guilt and sentencing stages
will further allow juries to focus dispassionately on determining guilt with comfort that a
conviction’s consequences will not be entirely unmoored from their own moral conscience.
By forcing the jury to look to its conscience and its conscience alone when forming the
advisory sentence, its sentence will represent the purest sense of just desert available to the
criminal justice system. And, by implementing these procedures as a feature of the criminal
jury right rather than an alternative to the jury right, the system-wide benefits it conveys
may be captured with little additional burden on the courts.
Hypothetically, even if all the foregoing proposals are implemented, it is possible
that judges may not afford advisory sentences any persuasive effect. The realization that
some judges are happy to defer to juries to help relieve themselves of the moral burden of
imposing sentences cuts against this notion.223 Nevertheless, one may surmise that judges
do not need advice on sentencing and will not follow a recommendation even if given. If
so, is there any point to the criminal advisory jury or is it adding costs, however marginal,
to the trial process without any benefit whatsoever?
Notably, advisory sentences will benefit the legal system even if their effect on actual
sentences is insubstantial. Advisory sentences will become a part of the trial record and the
aggregation of such data will be invaluable to sentencing reform efforts. Judges and
prosecutors too will benefit over time by learning the community “price” for particular
offenses. Further, if actual sentences result in harsher punishment than advisory sentences,
defendants may potentially gain a supporting argument for use in future parole hearings or
pardon petitions. And if actual sentences result in more leniency, the advisory sentence will
at least come to be seen as a telling form of public reprimand. Finally, jurors themselves
will take greater satisfaction in their civic duties given the opportunity to express their
moral opinions of the criminal acts—an opportunity which the verdict alone does not
222

Yet another alternative to a non-unanimous decision rule would be to time limit the sentencing decision.
If the advisory jury does not reach a unanimous sentencing consensus within a certain time (three hours, for
instance), then the jury will forego recommending a sentence to the judge.
223
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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adequately provide. Ultimately, then, even if advisory sentences are ignored in sentencing
decisions, the benefits they will afford to parties, the court, and society will still outweigh
their costs.
CONCLUSION
The jury’s prime function in the criminal justice system is to express community
outrage and thereby provide legitimacy for the exercise of state power. This idea is diluted,
however, if the jury is only allowed a voice in the verdict and not in the punishment. The
proposals set forth in this Note increase the jury’s voice at sentencing without dissolving
the trust and flexibility inherent with judicial discretion. These proposals admittedly
include intuitive and logical arguments requiring empirical study. However, jury
sentencing advocates should view them as modest proposals that expand jury influence
incrementally, without the need to alter Sixth Amendment jurisprudence or overcome longstanding legal community aversion to abdicating punishment authority to the layperson.
Likewise, jury sentencing opponents who fear the lay adjudicator may take comfort
that the judge still reigns supreme over sentencing. And correspondingly, the legal
community may test doubts of jury competence with little consequence or additional
procedural burden on the courts. Certainly, the criminal advisory jury is not a perfect
solution for any side of the sentencing reform debate. But in the spirit of compromise, let
not perfect be the enemy of good.
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